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Summary
Neuronal theories of conscious access tentatively relate
conscious perception to the integration and global broad-
casting of information across distant cortical and thalamic
areas [1–6]. Experiments contrasting visible and invisible
stimuli support this view and suggest that global neuronal
communication may be detectable using scalp electroen-
cephalography (EEG) [3, 5–11]. However, whether global
information sharing across brain areas also provides a spe-
cific signature of conscious state in awake but noncommuni-
cating patients remains an active topic of research [12–15].
We designed a novel measure termed ‘‘weighted symbolic
mutual information’’ (wSMI) andapplied it to 181high-density
EEG recordings of awake patients recovering from coma
and diagnosed in various states of consciousness. The
results demonstrate that thismeasure of information sharing
systematically increases with consciousness state, particu-
larly across distant sites. This effect sharply distinguishes
patients in vegetative state (VS), minimally conscious state
(MCS), and conscious state (CS) and is observed regardless
of etiology and delay since insult. The present findings sup-
port distributed theories of conscious processing and open
up the possibility of an automatic detection of conscious
states, whichmay be particularly important for the diagnosis
of awake but noncommunicating patients.Results
We evaluated whether measures of brain-scale information
sharing, derived from 181 high-density electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) recordings, could discriminate, within awake9These authors contributed equally to this work
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(J.D.S.)patients, those showing clinical signs of consciousness from
those who do not. Our research capitalizes on experimental
studies in normal subjects showing that consciously perceived
stimuli, relative to subliminal stimuli, lead to a late ignition
of frontoparietal networks and to an increased sharing of
information in the brain [3]. Several theories share the hypoth-
esis that this global communication between distant cortical
areas defines what we experience as a conscious content
[1–6, 16–18].
To quantify global information sharing, we introduced
a novel measure, weighted symbolic mutual information
(wSMI), which evaluates the extent to which two EEG signals
present nonrandom joint fluctuations, suggesting that they
share information (Figure 1). This method presents three
main advantages. First, it looks for qualitative or ‘‘symbolic’’
patterns of increase or decrease in the signal, which allows a
fast and robust estimation of the signals’ entropies. The sym-
bolic transformation depends on the length of the symbols
(here, k = 3) and their temporal separation (here, t = 4, 8, 16
or 32 ms; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures and
[19]). Second, wSMI makes few hypotheses on the type of
interactions and provides an efficient way to detect nonlinear
coupling. Third, the wSMI weights discard the spurious corre-
lations between EEG signals arising from common sources
and favor nontrivial pairs of symbols, as confirmed by simula-
tions (see Figure S1 available online).
We focused our analyses on patients with preserved arousal
abilities. Within this category, vegetative state (VS) patients
present no clinical signs of conscious behavior, whereas mini-
mally conscious state (MCS) patients demonstrate fluctuating
but consistent deliberate responses [20].
wSMI Indexes the State of Consciousness
When considering the median wSMI across all channel pairs,
analyses with t = 32 ms revealed that VS patients (n = 75)
presented significantly lower information sharing than MCS
patients (n = 68; U = 3737, p < 1025, area under the curve
[AUC] = 0.73), conscious (CS) patients (n = 24; U = 1445,
p < 1025, AUC = 0.80), and healthy (H) controls (n = 14; U =
890, p < 1024, AUC = 0.85) (Figure 2A). A robust regression
confirmed that median wSMI predicted the clinical group to
which the subjects belonged (1: VS, 2: MCS, 3: CS, 4: healthy;
p < 1026). These effects were observed for all temporal sepa-
ration parameters t, except the shortest value of t = 4 ms
(Figure S2A).
wSMI Is Consistent across Etiologies and Delay
since Insult
We tested the robustness of wSMI to variability in etiologies
and delay since the initial insult. An ANOVA across patients,
consciousness states and etiologies showed a main effect of
consciousness state [F(2,119) = 11.96, p < 1024] but no main
effect of etiology [F(3,119) = 1.83, p = 0.145]. The difference
in median wSMI between VS and MCS patients remained sig-
nificant within cases of anoxia [n = (23 VS, 9 MCS); U = 181,
p = 0.001, AUC = 0.87], traumatic brain injury [n = (21, 27);
U = 126, p = 0.001, AUC = 0.78] and stroke [n = (18, 20);
U = 102, p = 0.024, AUC = 0.72] (Figure 2B).
Figure 1. Weighted Symbolic Mutual Information
(A) The transformation of continuous signals (X) into sequences ( bX ) of
discrete symbols (A, B,. F) enables an easy and robust estimation of the
mutual information shared between two signals. The t parameter refers to
the temporal separation of the elements that constitute a symbol,
composed of three elements.
(B) By computing the joint probability of each pair of symbols, we can esti-
mate the symbolic mutual information (SMI) shared across two signals.
(C) To compute weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI), the SMI is
weighted to disregard conjunctions of identical or opposite-sign symbols,
which could potentially arise from common-source artifacts.
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1915Similarly, whenwe categorized the patients according to the
time delay between disorder onset and EEG recording [acute
(<25 days), intermediate (25–50 days), or chronic (>50 days)],
we again found a main effect of consciousness state[F(2,132) = 10.01, p < 1024] but no main effect of delay
[F(2,132) = 2.24, p = 0.110]. The difference in median wSMI
between VS and MCS patients remained significant within
chronic [n = (23 VS, 18 MCS); U = 295, p = 0.022, AUC = 0.71]
and intermediate [n = (25, 25); U = 98, p < 1024, AUC = 0.84]
patients and was marginal in acute subjects [n = (28, 24); U =
443, p = 0.054, AUC = 0.66] (Figure 2D). Patients tested just
after the insult (<10 days) presented a significant effect as
well [n = (6, 6); U = 36, p = 0.002, AUC = 1.00; Figure 2C].
Relationship between wSMI and Other Entropy or Spectral
Measures
Does wSMI merely detect a difference that is also present in
simpler measures? First, mutual information need not covary
with the entropies of the two signals but is bounded by
them. Empirically, we found that permutation entropy sig-
nificantly increased with consciousness states (Figure S2I).
Crucially, the differences in wSMI between VS and MCS
patients remained significant after normalizing the sym-
bolic mutual information by local permutation entropy (Fig-
ure S2J). Thus, wSMI did not simply reflect changes in local
entropies.
Similarly, the power in various frequency bands correlated
partially with wSMI (Table S2) and was informative about the
patients’ state of consciousness (Figure S2G). Nevertheless,
in a stepwise regression, median wSMI at t = 16 and 32 ms
systematically outperformed power spectrum measures in
discriminating VS and MCS patients. Furthermore, once
wSMI was entered in the model, spectral differences were no
longer predictive. At shorter t (4 or 8 ms), the converse pattern
was observed: power spectrum measures contributed to
the prediction of consciousness state whereas wSMI did not
(Table S3). Therefore, for long t, wSMI provides robust
information about consciousness over and above power
spectral densities.
A distinct question is which frequency bands carry the
effects detected by wSMI. Each selection of a t value sensi-
tizes wSMI to a different frequency range (w4–10 Hz for t =
32 ms; w8–20 Hz for t = 16 ms; Figure S2H). Further band-
pass filtering prior to wSMI computation suggested that the
difference between VS and MCS was particularly driven by
events in the q band (4–8 Hz). However, no consistent group
differences were found in phase-locking value or phase-lock-
ing index at 4Hz or above, and phase locking alone did not
suffice to explain the difference in wSMI (Tables S4 and S5).
wSMI Impairments Predominate over Centroposterior
Regions
Topographies summarizing the amount of information that
each EEG channel shares with others suggest that the infor-
mation sharing deficit in VS patients was present over most
scalp regions (pFDR < 0.05 in more than 97% of the current
sources, Figure 3A). When comparing VS to MCS patients,
the median wSMI over frontal areas was less impaired than it
was over the posterior regions (Fz versus Pz EEG channels;
U = 2035, p = 0.038, AUC = 0.60).
To facilitate the interpretation of the very large number of
channel pairs (Figures S3C–S3E), we reduced our data to
16 clusters composed of w16 current sources each. The
results confirmed that VS patients exhibited an overall
reduction of information sharing mainly with centroposterior
areas (Figure 3B): 48% of the 120 cluster pairs showed signif-
icantly smaller wSMI in VS than in MCS or in CS patients
(pFDR < 0.05).
Figure 2. wSMI Indexes Consciousness Independently of Etiology and Delay since Insult
The median wSMI across current sources is depicted for each state of consciousness (A). Error bars represent SEM. Significant pairwise comparisons are
denoted with asterisks. Analyses were reproduced for each etiology (B) and delay since insult (C and D). The results showed that median wSMI is mainly
affected by the state of consciousness and does not vary significantly across etiology or delays.
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1916Variations with Interchannel Distance
To test the hypothesis of a change in brain-scale information
sharing, we investigated the relationship between wSMI and
the Euclidian distance separating the channels. For distances
below 5 cm, wSMI quickly dropped toward zero, as expected
given that this measure was designed to eliminate common
source artifacts (Figures 4A and S4A). We therefore avoided
these short distances and restricted our analyses to five
equally spaced distances for which the median wSMI values
were comparable at t = 32 ms. wSMI discriminated VS from
MCS at all but the shortest interchannel distance (Figure 4C).
The interaction of distance with consciousness state (VS
versusMCS)was significant when pitting the shortest distance
against any of the longer ones (all p < 0.028). Thus, wSMI is
robust to variations in interchannel distance except in the
very short range, suggesting that loss of consciousness is
associated with an impairment in information sharing over
medium-to-long distances. With nonweighted SMI, the differ-
ence between VS and MCS was weaker and was invariant to
interchannel distance (Figures S4C and S4D).
Discussion
Several theoretical models of consciousness predict that
brain-scale information sharing should provide a consistent
signature of conscious processing [1–6, 16–18, 21]. In agree-
ment with this prediction, we show that wSMI, which estimates
the amount of information shared by two EEG signals, in-
creases as a function of consciousness state and separates
vegetative state (VS) from minimally conscious state (MCS)
patients. This increase appears particularly prominent across
centroposterior areas and across medium and long inter-
channel distances.
These results supplement recent EEG studies investigating
the relationship between information sharing and loss of
consciousness using spectral-based functional connectivity
measures [13, 22]. The present work relies on a large group
of patients, which allowed us to demonstrate the indepen-
dence of our findings from etiology and delay since insult.Moreover, our measure, unlike several traditional synchrony
measures, minimizes common-source artifacts and improves
the discriminability of consciousness states. Finally, we
show that its changes cannot be simply reduced to local
changes in entropy or power spectrum but reflects a genuine
change in information sharing particularly detectable over
medium and long distances across the scalp. A similar change
may also exist at shorter distances, but, due to common-
source artifacts, scalp EEG is unlikely to provide conclusive
information on this point.
The observed change in brain-scale information sharing
fits with earlier observations showing that the state of con-
sciousness can be affected by diffuse anatomical lesions to
the cortex and the underlying white matter as well as to the
thalamic and brain stem nuclei. In particular, several studies
have underlined the prominent role of diffuse white matter
lesions in persistent VS [23–26]. These anatomical lesions
may lead to functional deficits in thalamocortical [27, 28]
as well as corticocortical communication [15, 29–31] and
to abnormal default mode network activity in VS patients
[23, 30–34], all of which would result in reduced mutual infor-
mation over long corticocortical distances, as observed here.
wSMI could be computed after cortical source modeling,
but this step remains fraught with inaccuracies, particularly
given the patients’ frequent brain and skull damage [35].
Instead, our analyses were performed after applying a
current-source-density transform to EEG recordings, which
coarsely focalizes the effects over the corresponding cortical
regions. Topographically, the largest differences in informa-
tion sharing between VS and MCS patients were found over
centroposterior regions. Although this effect may appear at
odds with the preponderant role of the prefrontal cortex in
conscious processing [3, 6, 36], it fits with the recent identifi-
cation of posterior cingulate and precuneus as essential
hubs of cortical networks [3] and the correlation of mesiopar-
ietal activity with the state of consciousness [37]. In particular,
numerous studies have highlighted a frequent hypoactivation
of the precuneus and posterior cingulate in VS patients [38].
These areas participate in the default mode network and
Figure 3. wSMI Increases with Consciousness, Primarily over Centroposterior Regions
(A) The median wSMI that each EEG channel shares with all other channels is depicted for each state of consciousness.
(B) 120 pairs formed by 16 clusters of EEG channels are depicted as 3D arcs whose height is proportional to the Euclidian distance separating the two clus-
ters. Line color and thickness are proportional to the mean wSMI shared by the corresponding cluster pair.
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self and others, episodic memory, and mental imagery [39,
40], i.e., processes that are characteristic of the conscious
brain.
Our study could be criticized for pooling over a group of VS
patients, while recent fMRI results suggest that some of them
may actually show preserved consciousness undetectable
by classical clinical examination [41, 42]. However, recent
estimates suggest that this may concern w15%–20% of VS
patients [42]. Although their presence in our data cannot be
excluded, it would minimally affect our conclusions and only
reduce our effect sizes. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to measure wSMI separately in VS patients with as well
as without a capacity for fMRI-based communication. In the
former, we predict that wSMI should remain quantitatively
unimpaired.
Our findings are compatible with theories that associate
consciousness with recurrent loops in posterior networks [4],
a distributed brain-scale global workspace [3, 6], or a
‘‘dynamic core’’ [2]. They add to the panoply of behavioral
and neuroimaging tools available to diagnose disorders of
consciousness [38]. Our measure has the advantage of using
EEG, a measure available in all clinics, rather than the complex
and costly method of fMRI combined with instructions such
as imagining playing tennis [41] or answering a spoken ques-
tion [42]. In a recent fMRI study [42], 28 out of 33 MCS patients
with consistent behavioral signs of consciousness showed no
fMRI markers of deliberate communication. Future research
should investigate whether the present technique, which
may detect any residual brain-scale information sharing,
proves more sensitive. Ultimately, a combination of neuro-
imaging and behavioral measures is likely to provemost useful
in the clinic.
Experimental Procedures
This study has been approved by the ethical committee of the Salpetriere
Hospital (Paris). Detailed experimental procedures and clinical details are
provided in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Table S1.Participants
181 EEG recordings (75 VS, 68 MCS, and 24 CS patients, as well as
14 healthy controls) were obtained from 126 subjects (age: M = 47 years
old, SD = 18 years, males: 72%) who performed an auditory paradigm for
clinical purposes [43]. All patients had been without sedation for at least
24 hr prior to the recording session, which was performed to help assess
their diagnosis and their state of consciousness. Before each EEG
recording, trained neurologists (F.F., B.R., and L.N.) performed a clinical
evaluation of the patients with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)
from which patients’ arousal and state of consciousness was derived [44].
Note that CS patients differed from healthy subjects as they presented
important brain lesions, were often recovering from a VS or an MCS, and
were recorded at bedside. Data from healthy subjects were only used to
verify the consistency of the proposed measure of consciousness.
Experimental Design and EEG Preprocessing
Analyses were based on 800 ms time periods, during which subjects
were presented to four consecutive identical tones. EEG preprocessing is
described in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Weighted Symbolic Mutual Information
EEG signals were first transformed in a series of discrete symbols defined
by the ordering of k time samples separated by a temporal separation t
(Figure 1). Analysis was restricted to a fixed symbol size (k = 3) and four
different values of t (t = 4, 8, 16, or 32 ms between time samples). Signals
were low-pass filtered at corresponding frequencies (40, 20, and 10 Hz for
t = 8, 16, and 32 ms respectively) to avoid aliasing artifacts. Then wSMI
was estimated for each pair of transformed EEG signals by estimating the
joint probability of each pair of symbols. The joint probability matrix was
multiplied by binary weights to reduce spurious correlations between sig-
nals. The weights were set to zero for pairs of identical symbols, which
could be elicited by a unique common source, and for opposed symbols,
which could reflect the two sides of a single electric dipole.
Cluster analyses were performed by averaging wSMI obtained across the
256 3 (256 2 1) / 2 channel pairs within 16 3 (16 2 1) / 2 manually selected
regions. The distance separating EEG channels was calculated along a
straight line using default electrode coordinates.
Statistics
Except if stated otherwise, statistical analyses were performed with R
and MATLAB (2009b) and nonparametric two-tail tests (Wilcoxon, Mann-
Whitney U tests, and MATLAB’s robust and stepwise regressions). Effect
sizes are reported using receiver operating curve (ROC) and AUC analyses.
Figure 4. wSMI as Function of Interchannel Distance
(A) wSMI is plotted as a function of the Euclidian distance separating each
pair of EEG channels. While wSMI is relatively stable between 8 and
23 cm, it drops toward zero as interchannel distances diminish, which
thus confirms its robustness to common source artifacts.
(B) Histogram plotting the density of channel pairs as a function of
interchannel distance.
(C) VS patients presented lower wSMI than MCS and CS patients, parti-
cularly over medium and long interchannel distances (>10 cm).
Current Biology Vol 23 No 19
1918False discovery rate (FDR) was used to control for multiple comparisons
(noted as pFDR).
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes four figures, five tables, Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, and Supplemental Results and can be found
with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.07.075.
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